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The year was 1736, and two canoes quietly 
paddled across the water of the Niagara 
River illuminated only by moonlight. 
The canoes’ pilots moved slowly and 
silently and slipped beyond the gaze 
of Fort Niagara which was perched on 
a small outcropping on the east bank 
overlooking the mouth of the river. The 
canoes’ occupants – a French fur trader 
by the name of Joseph LaFrance and eight 
of his friends from the Iroquois tribe – 
proceeded cautiously, wary of the penalties 
they would face for their illegal smuggling 
venture if detected by French authorities 
in the fort.  The commander would likely 
have had them all thrown into chains and 
confiscated their valuable bounty of furs 
for the Crown’s profit. The group quietly 
glided through the shadows – the striking 
torch lit figure of Fort Niagara looming 
over their backs – and into Lake Ontario, 
deftly avoiding notice.  They soon crossed 
Niagara Falls and continued toward their 
ultimate destination, the British Fort 
at Oswego. There, Joseph LaFrance – 
seeking a greater profit than trade with the 
officials of his home country could offer 
– waited in the forest near the fort while 
his Iroquois companions negotiated with 
British officials and merchants to secure 
the profit LaFrance desired from his furs. 
Once his furs had been sold, LaFrance and 
his companions returned the way they had 
come, making another long canoe trip to 
LaFrance’s usual stomping grounds near 
Fort Michilimackinac.  Joseph LaFrance’s 
story is not an unusual one. In fact, 
in many ways, LaFrance embodies the 
experience of a typical fur trader operating 
in North America during the colonial 
period. He professed no attachment or 
loyalty to his country and undermined its 
profits as he sought to multiply his own – 
as so many others did.
British and French fur traders in the 17th 
and 18th centuries navigated a complex 
world dominated by imperial politics and 
intercultural conflict accompanied by 
near-constant danger. While frontier fur 
traders generally sought profit before all 
other considerations when trading with 
Native Americans, the experiences of fur 
traders associated with the British Empire 
differed significantly from those aligned 
with France. These differences resulted both 
from the   divergent objectives of British 
and French colonialism in North America 
and from the variety of cultural differences 
amongst the tribes who traded with the 
Europeans. Imperial officials aimed to 
control the lucrative profits of the fur 
trade through various forms of regulation, 
which traders from both empires frequently 
resisted with independent action. Further 
examination reveals that the French 
coureurs de bois and British traders exhibited 
much greater agency in making important 
decisions than one may expect. French 
traders enjoyed significant autonomy at the 
point of exchange; decisions they made on 
the spot carried substantial ramifications 
on the relationship between France and 
the tribes trading with them as well as the 
overall health of the trade. British traders – 
whose trade was generally confined to posts 
– ventured beyond British borders and set 
up their own trading posts outside imperial 
regulations. This paper examines how the 
structural differences between the British 
and French fur trades and the numerous 
objectives of native villages coupled to 
create an environment in which fur traders 
could act as independent actors, though 
they emerged in different forms. 
Scholarship surrounding fur traders focuses 
primarily on a macro-level analysis of 
the frontiersmen and how they operated 
within an imperially dominated exchange 
network. Scholars tend to discuss fur 
traders primarily within the context of 
the European fur trade in North America, 
presenting them as the furthest extensions 
of imperial policy, and merely the cogs in 
an imperial fur machine. This Euro-centric 
perspective neglects much of the agency 
that fur traders exhibited in their individual 
interactions with Native Americans, which 
often took place hundreds of miles from 
the nearest official. This approach also 
fails to discuss the significant effects that 
the personal relationships and interactions 
of individual fur traders had on their 
countries relationship and policy toward 
native peoples. While existing scholarship 
provides valuable knowledge regarding 
the overall health and functioning of the 
fur trade from a variety of perspectives, 
no work seems to be specifically dedicated 
to presenting a fully comparative view of 
fur traders in British and French North 
America. 
Most authors primarily deal with either 
the British, French, or Native American 
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perspective of the fur trade focusing their 
greatest efforts on one or two over the 
other(s). For example, Eric Jay Dolin’s 
book Fur, Fortune, and Empire: The Epic 
History of the Fur Trade in America provides 
an excellent overview of the history of the 
North American fur trade. While he does 
touch on the actions and motivations of 
individual tribes, his work is largely focused 
on British and French perspectives.1 On 
the other hand, Richard White’s book 
The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, 
and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815 offers an in-depth discussion 
of the intense cross-cultural dialogue 
facilitated by the fur trade. However, his 
work emphasizes primarily the perspectives 
of tribes in the trade and does not direct 
much effort toward discussion of the 
traders’ agency.2 These two works are 
representative of many approaches taken by 
fur trade scholars. 
Three major players dominated the North 
American fur trade: a great number of 
tribes – whose interests were not always 
aligned but often similar – the British, and 
the French. Though the degree to which 
they became economically dependent 
upon Europeans and their trade goods 
continues to be a matter of debate, as 
historian Daniel K. Richter noted, the 
trade became “absolutely crucial” for 
Native Americans seeking a number of 
essential commodities.3 Longtime French 
trader Pierre Gaultier de Varennes de 
La Vérendrye noted that “powder, ball, 
tobacco, axes, knives, chisels, and awls” 
were among the most highly desired goods 
by many tribes.4 In the early years of the 
fur trade, then-scarce European goods 
often carried a symbolic value rather than 
a solely practical one and many societies 
bestowed significant prestige and influence 
upon their brethren who possessed and 
subsequently traded away these goods.5 
Thus, as Richard White asserts, rather than 
imposing economic dependence on Native 
Americans, European goods became “a 
cultural necessity” long before they arose 
as a material one.6 However, as these goods 
became more common among the tribes 
of North America and spread further west, 
the crafting and hunting traditions that 
these goods either made obsolete or much 
easier gradually faded into distant memory 
if they were not forgotten entirely.7 
While many tribes did rely entirely on 
direct trade with Europeans early on, this 
dependence existed only in an economic 
sense; most of these tribes remained 
politically independent of New France and 
the British colonies.
Individual tribes exercised significant 
autonomy and influence in the fur trade 
dynamic and frequently played European 
powers against each other in favor of their 
own agenda. For example, the Assiniboine 
and Cree tribes of Upper Canada enjoyed 
a trade monopoly after the 1720s as the 
middlemen of all trade coming into the 
Hudson’s Bay Company post at Fort 
Bourbon, as well as many of the numerous 
French trading posts nearby. These tribes 
enforced and expanded their grip on 
this trade often through violence.8 They 
exchanged furs gathered from tribes beyond 
their own territory – such as the Mandan 
and Blackfoot – as well as their own for 
new manufactured goods with European 
traders. The Assiniboine and Cree would 
eventually return to the western tribes and 
exchange their moderately used European 
goods for a new batch of furs and repeating 
the process regularly.9 Any group wishing 
to make the long trek through their 
territory to the post at Fort Bourbon – also 
known as York Factory – had to be escorted 
by members of the tribe.10 
After obtaining furs, the Assiniboine and 
Cree tribes could trade them with either 
the French or the British. Though these 
tribes were generally aligned with the 
English, a significant number of these 
middlemen chose to divert their trade to 
nearby French traders.11 They could obtain 
different kinds of goods from each partner 
and in turn exchanged different types of 
furs with each of them.12 Therefore the 
Assiniboine and Cree exerted tremendous 
influence as the central, pivotal powers 
in this area of the fur trade.13 This level 
of political – and often economic – 
independence was not unique to these 
tribes nor to tribes who traded with the 
English. Most tribes engaged in the fur 
trade wielded substantial autonomy and 
influence as independent political and 
economic actors in the dynamics of the 
North American fur trade.
Most Native American groups involved 
in the fur trade inextricably tied trade 
and exchange of any kind directly to 
personal relationships. One generally did 
not exist without the other.14 Most tribes 
insisted on establishing friendly relations 
by performing ceremonies of friendship 
and sharing food, drink, smoke, and 
exchanging other gifts with traders before 
the profitable trade could take place. This 
approach to trade stood in stark contrast 
to the European model of a business 
transaction, namely the act of buying 
and selling goods with strangers for some 
arbitrarily valued currency.15 Moreover, the 
goal of many tribes in trade – with both 
Europeans and other tribes – was not to 
garner the greatest profit possible from the 
transaction but to ensure the satisfaction 
of all parties involved.16 In many native 
cultures involved in the fur trade, the 
accumulation of individual wealth was 
discouraged and very uncommon.17 
Most Native Americans traded primarily 
to clothe and decorate themselves with 
European wool and trinkets, to acquire 
highly useful metal tools, and to resupply 
precious gunpowder and ammunition for 
their next hunt.18
The friendships of native villages extended 
only to individual traders and not 
necessarily to the European empire they 
hailed from. Most tribes in North America 
were only loose collections of villages who 
shared common culture, traditions, and 
bloodlines. As such, most connections 
with Europeans formed at a village level.19 
Relationships between tribes and the 
European powers were largely built and 
maintained through the relationships of 
fur traders and village leaders. Villages 
often maintained independent relations 
with different colonies and enabled 
them to retain a degree of political 
independence.20 One author compared fur 
traders to “the rungs of a ladder” because 
both “connected two parallel worlds and 
kept them from crashing together in a 
catastrophic collapse.”21 The fur trade could 
not function in the same way – if at all – 
without fur traders’ personal dealings. The 
significance of their work granted them a 
significant degree of autonomy and leverage 
in dealing with imperial officials and village 
leaders which was often exerted to carve a 
greater profit for themselves.
The French and the British took vastly 
different approaches in responding to the 
trade customs of the tribes they traded 
with. The French generally met their 
trading partners on a cultural middle 
ground.22 They embraced the interlocked 
nature of trade and friendship with Native 
Americans and often turned it to their 
advantage. They traded with numerous 
villages across the pays d’en haut, the Upper 
Country – a term generally referring to 
the area of French influence north of the 
Ohio River Valley and into what is now 
Canada – cultivating not only revenue, 
but also alliances.23 Friendly relations with 
several tribes – including the Algonquin, 
the Huron-Petun, the Potawatomi, and 
the Ojibwa, among many others – were 
crucial to the very survival of New France 
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as a colony, as it ensured some degree of 
stability and security within the fur trade.24 
French officials often deemed the political 
and military benefits of these alliances 
more important than the actual revenue 
generated by the trade fostering them. 
France reaped its profit in the fur trade 
from the sale of fermiers – monopolies 
granted to companies of merchants on 
the export of furs from New France. In 
other words, the French crown would buy 
their furs and only their furs.25 Thus the 
health of the overall fur trade was most 
important to French officials.26 As such, 
French officials frequently sold goods at 
a loss in order to force prices down to 
levels that allied tribes would be more 
satisfied with and to divert trade from the 
English.27 France attempted to regulate the 
number of traders in the Upper Country 
by issuing licenses to individual traders 
known as congés.28 While France could not 
directly control these illegal traders, officials 
could increase the number of congés in 
circulation, pressuring the coureurs de bois 
to conform to market prices and not to 
exploit Native Americans in exchanges.29 
These actions helped to improve the health 
of the overall trade and happiness of French 
trading partners.
France’s broader colonial interests explain 
much of the nature of France’s fur trade 
in North America. France never promoted 
long-term settlement in New France, 
and instead directed their efforts toward 
the flourishing fur trade and converting 
indigenous peoples to Christianity. Many 
more fur traders inhabited New France 
than traditional settlers: according to 
a 1625 report, only twenty permanent 
settlers lived in Quebec, and they were far 
outnumbered by fur traders in the area.30 
French historian Pierre de Charlevoix 
journeyed to Quebec in 1720 tasked with 
reporting back on the settlement’s state 
to the Crown and stated that in terms of 
infrastructure one “might reduce it to the 
rank of our smallest cities in France” and 
noted “no more than seven thousand souls 
at Quebec.”31 He went on in one of his 
many letters back to France to lament the 
lack of people in New France suggesting 
that the colony might be as successful and 
profitable as any other in North America if 
it were only sufficiently populated.32 France 
had little interest in large-scale agricultural 
development and rarely competed directly 
with native villages for game or fish. If they 
did, it was usually precisely focused and 
done with the express permission of the 
village who claimed the resource.33 France’s 
focus on non-settlement activities meant 
that their demand for tribal lands and 
resources presented much less of a threat to 
Native Americans.
Most fur traders working in the pay d’en 
haut practiced the exchange technique 
characteristic of those traders operating in 
French territory known as en derouine.34 
This term refers to fur traders embarking 
on lengthy voyages from trade posts such 
as Fort Michilimackinac, Fort La Reine, 
and Montreal – where they purchased 
or traded for European trade goods – to 
villages deep in the Upper Country, where 
they traded those goods for prized beaver, 
bear, and mink furs, then returning to 
the posts to trade and sell them.35 Fur 
trader Joseph LaFrance, according to an 
interview recorded by Sir Arthur Dobbs 
and published in 1744, made such annual 
round trips for a decade from his base at 
Fort Michilimackinac to a friendly village 
called Michipicoten just north of Lake 
Superior.36 The near-constant, seasonal 
movement required by trading en derouine 
meant that fur traders were among the 
most well-traveled people in America; some 
estimates hold that Joseph LaFrance canoed 
over 17,000 miles throughout the Upper 
Country over the course of his career.37 En 
derouine enabled traders to make the face 
to face contact necessary to facilitate and 
maintain long-term trading friendships 
with villages.
Coureurs de bois often encountered 
friendly villages willing to feed and house 
them along their journey, and fur traders 
frequently took this opportunity to foster 
new trade and friendship. Upon reaching 
a village, a trader was usually welcomed 
as a friend and engaged in the traditional 
friendship ceremonies before discussions 
of trade began. For example, French trader 
and explorer Nicolas Perrotfound found 
a warm and celebratory reception among 
the Miami and Mascouten of Green Bay.38 
Sitting him on a buffalo skin, they offered 
him the calumet, a traditional pipe of peace 
and friendship, and food after which a 
village leader carried him into the center of 
the village on his shoulders. They housed 
and feasted him for over a week, trading 
and fortifying their new friendship.39 After 
the ceremonies were complete, a trader 
might then exchange what goods and furs 
had already been gathered or arrange a 
later time to meet and gather the season’s 
fur bounty, acquainting themselves with 
the surrounding lands and villages in the 
meantime, as La Vérendrye did in 1737.40 
The time fur traders spent living among 
tribes provided the foundations of the 
friendships that were so crucial to the fur 
trade’s success.
The lives of fur traders were not all tales of 
friendship and comfort. Traders journeying 
into the pays d’en haut faced an impressive 
variety of danger at every turn. As Joseph 
LaFrance found out, the tumultuous waters 
of Upper Country’s many rivers presented 
the “utmost danger and difficulty in going 
by water.”41 While their handmade birch-
bark canoes were quite maneuverable and 
durable, the small crafts could not handle 
the more ferocious waves. Rough waters 
forced traders to disembark and carry 
their goods, furs, and boats overland to 
the next navigable point in the river. They 
were forced to stop and hunt frequently, 
as traders stuffed their meager cargo space 
with as much fur and valuable goods as 
they could.42 Fur traders also faced the 
threat of attack from unfriendly tribes. 
On his final trade venture to York Factory 
in 1740, LaFrance traded and celebrated 
with the Monsoni and Sturgeon tribes on 
an island in the Lake of the Woods where 
almost two dozen Frenchmen including La 
Verendrye’s oldest son  had recently been 
slaughtered by a Sioux war party.43 The 
fear of being violently raided and having 
all their stock stolen was quite prevalent 
among fur traders.44 If they were to survive, 
fur traders had to forge their own means of 
defense against this threat, either through 
force or by strong friendships.45 Successful 
fur traders realized the value of cultivating 
close relationships with Native American 
villages, and many attained positions of 
leadership and respect among them.
Many coureurs de bois were well-respected 
members of the native communities they 
traded with and valued for their primary 
connection to the European market. 
Many came to lead tribes in a number 
of ways. Some, like Joseph LaFrance, 
did so in an economic sense. In 1743, 
he led a large fleet of canoes from Cedar 
Lake to the English post at York Factory, 
bringing an estimated 50,000 beaver 
furs and 9,000 martin skins.46 Some 
traders also took leadership in a military 
fashion. LaFrance led an attack against 
the enemies of some friends he had made 
at York Factory that failed miserably, 
while French trader Charles-Michel de 
Langlade led a substantial force of Ottawa 
and Chippewa warriors against the British 
post at Pickawillany and laid waste to the 
town and its inhabitants.47 Some, like Peter 
Chartier, even achieved political leadership. 
Born to a Frenchman and his Shawnee 
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wife, Chartier entered the fur trade with 
the English. He built his influence among 
his mother’s people and negotiated on their 
behalf before turning on the British and 
leading several attacks on British traders in 
1745.48 However, Chartier did not take up 
with the French. Instead, he stood for the 
Shawnee in negotiations with the French 
and resisted French orders to relocate the 
tribe further north.49 Considering the 
plentiful opportunities for autonomy, 
authority, and profit available to a coureur 
de bois Upper Country, it is no wonder 
that they developed a strong sense of 
independence from imperial authority 
that prompted them to smuggle and divert 
trade to the British.
The strict regulations and harsh 
punishments that France attempted 
to impose on illegal trade and traders 
often served only to push their trade to 
the English.50 This is likely what drove 
LaFrance to help lead that massive fur fleet 
– which included many of his own furs – 
to the British post at York Factory, rather 
than trading his furs with merchants at one 
of the nearby French posts. In 1737, three 
years before that trip, LaFrance canoed 
to Montreal in hopes of acquiring a congé 
and brought a large fur cargo for trade and 
valuable gifts for the governor-general, 
Charles de La Boische.51 The governor 
accepted his gifts but threatened to arrest 
and charge LaFrance with selling brandy 
to Native Americans. LaFrance managed 
to escape town but tried again a year later 
and was captured, stripped of his cargo, 
and his other belongings.52 Disenchanted 
with his trading partners, LaFrance set out 
on his journey to York Factory after a quick 
escape. LaFrance was certainly not alone in 
his disillusion with France’s bureaucracy; 
two of the earliest and most famous French 
traders, Pierre Esprit Radisson and Médard 
Chouart des Grosseilliers, bristled against 
French regulations. After risking their lives 
to gather furs for the French in dangerous 
Iroquois territory in the late 1650s, they 
requested permission for another voyage.53 
The governor overburdened them with 
restrictions on this second venture, so 
they set out on their own terms and were 
arrested upon their return in 1663. The 
governor imprisoned and fined them, 
confiscating nearly all their furs. Upon 
their release, they quickly turned to the 
English and soon played foundational roles 
in the establishment of the Hudson’s Bay 
Company.54 Thus, France effectively created 
its own greatest rival, which it continued 
to support by pushing French traders away 
with overly strict regulations.
While France and the coureurs de bois 
consistently made great efforts to meet 
their Native American friends on a 
cultural middle ground, the English hardly 
made an effort. They only embraced the 
connected nature of friendship and trade in 
a superficial way and only so long as they 
needed to. Instead of cultivating allies as 
the French did, the British sought to create 
subjects.55 The growing English colonies 
soon had much more manpower than 
New France, so British traders did not rely 
upon friendships with native villages for 
security as the coureurs de bois did.56 The 
English primarily traded with the Iroquois, 
Assiniboine, the Cree, the Shawnee, the 
Miami, the Pequots, and several other 
tribes across the Ohio River Valley and near 
Hudson’s Bay.
These aggressive British attitudes are no 
surprise when one considers their broader 
colonial focus. In general, British colonial 
policy aimed to create large, permanent 
settlements and exploit the abundant 
resources of North America.57 In the British 
colonies, settlers far outnumbered other 
residents such as fur traders. Farmers were 
especially prevalent, as the crown heavily 
promoted and rewarded the growth of 
capitalist agriculture in the colonies.58 The 
British colonies contained well over ten 
times the population of New France at its 
height, and these settlers typically “feared 
and despised” Native Americans.59 The 
animosity of English settlers largely resulted 
from the tension between them and the 
tribes who occupied the land they hoped 
to inhabit. With such a large population 
focusing their efforts toward acquiring land 
where they could establish a farm and settle 
their family, the English grated against 
the nerves of many native groups and 
presented a direct threat to their lands and 
livelihoods.
The British colonies often competed in the 
trade not just with the French, but with 
each other as well. As most tribes formed 
trade relationships at a village level, each 
British colony established and maintained 
its own independent fur trade.60 Thus, the 
colonies in close proximity to each other 
naturally competed for the same pool of 
furs from local tribes. Such competition 
sometimes turned violent as in 1634 
between the Plymouth and Massachusetts 
Bay Colonies. Fur trader John Hocking 
sailed upriver from New Hampshire to 
one of Plymouth Colony’s trading posts, 
fiercely determined to cut off the cargo 
being toted downriver by nearby tribes 
and take it for himself. He blatantly 
ignored warnings from the post’s leader, 
John Howland, and continued upriver, 
prompting Howland to gather a small 
group and chase him down.61 They found 
Hocking and his crew at anchor and began 
to cut his mooring cables so he would drift 
away. Hocking shot one of Howland’s men 
in the head and was immediately killed 
in retaliation.62 Hocking’s men retreated 
and soon complained to the governor of 
Massachusetts Bay Colony, John Winthrop. 
The colony was outraged, and Winthrop 
had a Plymouth magistrate – there entirely 
by happenstance – seized and imprisoned, 
holding him responsible for the events 
near the post.63 Tensions between the 
colonies ran high, but they soon arrived 
at a peaceful solution. However, the event 
sparked an expansion of the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony’s fur trade in Maine, and they 
soon strangled Plymouth Colony’s trade 
out of existence.64 Competition over the fur 
trade was ruthless even among countrymen.
While the coureurs de bois pushed further 
into western territory, the British colonies 
fortified trade closer to their borders. 
British fur traders generally did not travel 
to villages to generate trade. Instead, they 
insisted that Native American traders 
make the lengthy trek to trading posts and 
towns established along the frontier beyond 
the British colonies and near Hudson’s 
Bay.65 From these outposts, fur traders 
extended credit – in the form of trade 
goods – to native traders and middlemen, 
an investment expected to yield a profit 
the following spring in the form of furs. 
Traders often coerced Native Americans 
into signing away their lands as collateral 
in these exchanges.66 The actual point of 
exchange between English traders and 
Native Americans operated much the same 
way as it did with the French; ceremonies 
of friendship and gift-giving took place 
before trade began.67
English traders also faced significant 
danger in their work, as the trade posts 
they operated in were always under 
threat of attack. George Croghan, one 
of Britain’s most prominent and prolific 
traders, witnessed a trader murdered by 
a seemingly friendly Huron-Petun after 
an insultingly low trade offer; he offered 
“but one charge of powder and one bullet 
for a beaver skin to the Indian; the Indian 
took up a hatchet and knocked him on the 
head.”68 The stationary nature of English 
trading posts made them convenient targets 
for any retaliatory attacks directed at the 
British in general. Frenchmen often took 
up arms with the Shawnee and Delaware 
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against encroaching British trading posts 
in the Ohio River Valley in the 1750s.69 
However, being somewhat fortified and 
often garrisoned, they were in a far better 
position to defend themselves than the 
French and their allies usually were.
Most tribes did not hold their English 
trading friends in the same esteem as 
they did their French counterparts. They 
certainly harbored some bitterness at 
the ever-encroaching waves of English 
settlers forcing greater numbers of Native 
Americans out of their homelands, but 
this was also due in some part to the very 
character of the average British fur trader. 
As one historian noted, “most of these 
traders were the very scum of the earth.”70 
Many were notorious for being cheats and 
crooks engaging in dubious trade tactics.  
British Superintendent of Indian Affairs 
William Johnson frequently complained 
that these “men of lowest means” 
manipulated weights when dealing with 
Native Americans to secure a better profit, 
casting a shadow on the reputation of all 
British traders.71 Traders working for the 
Hudson’s Bay Company frequently fiddled 
with their report numbers to increase 
their returns.72 While the French overall 
enjoyed a very familial, friendly trade, 
British traders were abrasive and often 
pushed trade away with their greediness.73 
Circumventing imperial trade regulations 
and exploiting tribes in trade was one of a 
few ways that English traders ignored their 
national loyalties.
The variations in the structures of the 
French and British fur trades led to 
different forms of independent resistance 
to regulation. While the coureurs de bois 
enjoyed enough autonomy to divert their 
furs to whichever merchants offered them 
the best price, British traders operated 
under more direct supervision at trading 
posts. Some of them went to extreme 
measures to secure their own profit, 
like Thomas Morton. Born in England, 
Morton arrived in North America in 
1625, accompanying a venture intent on 
establishing a fur-trading operation on the 
Massachusetts Bay. After a harsh winter the 
captain, Wollaston, fled to the warmth of 
Virginia, leaving Morton behind to oversee 
the small outpost they had set up.74 Morton 
had become enamored with New England, 
once remarking on its unparalleled beauty, 
calling it “Nature’s Masterpiece.” Smitten, 
Morton refused Wollaston’s orders to send 
more of his servants south. Instead, Morton 
coerced many of them to stay behind and 
join his new venture. Morton established 
his own trading post on a nearby hill, 
eventually known as Merrymount. 
Merrymount was a post governed by few 
rules, and its members determined to enjoy 
life and reap a profit. Morton maintained 
close friendships with nearby villages and 
was reportedly enthralled by their way 
of life. He respected his native allies as 
“friends and co-conspirators,” a sentiment 
uncommon among British traders. 75
Merrymount traders primarily exchanged 
guns with local Massachusett and 
Narragansett peoples for beaver pelts. Trade 
thrived and Morton’s profits soared.76 The 
nearby Plymouth Colony found themselves 
disturbed by the “great licentiousness” of 
Morton’s crew and their antics, and the 
trade flowing through his post directly 
competed with their own, which was a vital 
source of income for the colony.77 Even 
more egregious was Morton’s willingness to 
fraternize and trade in firearms with Native 
Americans, an act prohibited by English 
law.78  Colonial officials issued a declaration 
to Morton in the spring of 1628, and 
warned him to cease his trade activities 
immediately, citing his violation of the 
King’s law. Morton defiantly replied that 
“the king was dead and his displeasure,” 
blatantly declaring his distaste for imperial 
control.79 Later that year, colonial officials 
organized a small expedition to force 
Morton from Merrymount and destroy 
the trade there. They soon deported him 
back to England after a trial.80 Morton 
had arrived in North America in England’s 
employ, exploited the imperial system to 
attain significant autonomy and profit, but 
returned to England as a prisoner.
In lieu of popular practice, some British 
traders did venture out to villages to generate 
trade. Two trade voyages by Hudson’s Bay 
Company employees Smith and Waggoner 
and William Pink offer details on such 
trips. Escorted by groups of friendly Cree 
natives on journeys from York Factory a 
decade apart, they hunted and trapped 
with their guides through autumn and 
winter, returning by canoe with a hefty load 
of furs in the spring.81 These experiences 
were not typical of English traders largely 
because wealthy merchants in Albany – 
whose goods were sold at trade posts across 
the colonies – heavily discouraged traders 
from venturing out to native villages, as 
they made far more money by containing 
trade to posts.82 British settlement efforts 
were also largely subordinated to trade 
development around the Hudson’s Bay area, 
meaning official supervision of the trade was 
also less prevalent.83 The experiences of these 
traders parallel those of the coureurs de bois 
practicing en derouine in a striking way. This 
suggests that the level of official supervision 
allowed for by the French trade system was 
a key factor in coureurs de bois being so 
independent.
A comparison of European trade systems 
reveals that the English enjoyed several 
advantages, but they also suffered from 
some crucial weaknesses inherent in their 
system. As mentioned above, the English 
manufactured higher quality goods than the 
French and could offer them at much better 
prices.84 They also offered much better prices 
for furs; two independent reports found that 
the English paid around two to four times as 
much as the French for fur.85 The restriction 
of trade to posts also allowed a great degree 
of imperial supervision over the course of 
trade, which gave England more control over 
exchange rates and profit margins. However, 
English insistence on making native traders 
journey long distances to British trade 
posts undoubtedly cost them a significant 
amount of trade, as distant tribes such as the 
Mountain and Blood tribes risked starvation 
with every trip to York Factory.86 If they 
could not take their trade to the French, they 
were forced to trade through middlemen 
like the Iroquois, the Assiniboine, and the 
Cree, usually under worse terms. This, in 
turn, constrained the English fur supply to 
only the middlemen groups and those who 
sneak by them, giving the natives significant 
leverage while negotiating with them. The 
French did not have this issue, as the far-
reaching coureurs de bois continually sought 
out new and diverse sources of furs spread 
across the Upper Country. 
The most significant difference between the 
French and British systems is the degree 
to which they allowed for official imperial 
supervision of the actual trade. As the 
coureurs de bois penetrated further west, 
they removed themselves further from the 
watchful French authorities. Since most of 
their trade occurred in native villages, no 
officials were present to ensure the terms 
favored New France nor to ensure that 
the furs made it back to French merchants 
and brought profit to the crown. The 
English system kept trade tightly restricted 
to trade posts where it could be observed, 
recorded, and any credit involved could be 
guaranteed. Consequently, imperial officials 
could directly oversee rates of exchange, 
interest, and lending practices. In addition, 
the fur bounty never had to be entrusted to 
unsupervised traders and could be shipped 
directly to Britain upon acquisition from 
Native Americans. Therefore, the vast 
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distances that characterized the French 
trade were directly responsible for the 
significant autonomy afforded to coureurs de 
bois, enabling them to become “nationless” 
actors more frequently than British traders. 
In many ways, this relatively small group 
of men navigated a complex world of 
intercultural trade and imperial rivalry and 
wielded enormous influence over Euro-
Native American relations and commerce. 
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